“Women in leading corporate positions and credit risk: Evidence from Italian firms” by Manello, Alessandro et al.
  
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 201/20 
 
 
 
WOMEN IN LEADING CORPORATE POSITIONS AND CREDIT 
RISK: EVIDENCE FROM ITALIAN FIRMS 
 
 
Alessandro Manello 
Greta Falavigna 
Eleonora Isaia 
Mariacristina Rossi 
 
 
 
 
May 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
Women in leading corporate positions and credit 
risk: Evidence from Italian firms 
Alessandro Manello  
IRCrES-CNR 
 
Greta Falavigna  
IRCrES-CNR 
 
Eleonora Isaia  
Department of Management – University of Turin & IRCrES-CNR 
 
Mariacristina Rossi  
Department of Management – University of Turin & Collegio Carlo Alberto & IRCrES-CNR 
 
Abstract 
The present paper aims to analyse whether the presence of women in leading positions can affect the risk profile 
of a firm. We provide new and more robust empirical evidence that there is a negative relationship between female 
participation in the top management and credit risk. We focus on a large and representative sample of Italian 
manufacturing firms, and we extract data on directors and top managers as well as rating classes and credit score 
indicators. We provide evidence of a significant credit risk reduction associated with the inclusion of women 
among the top managers of the firm, using a fixed effects model. Our results are robust to different model 
specifications and estimation strategies. We also find different magnitudes for the impact, with a greater impact 
associated with smaller firms. 
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1. Introduction 
Gender issues, female participation and the most suitable mechanism for rebalancing female participation 
remain hot topics in empirical studies at an international level, and they are also on the political agenda 
of most European countries. The European Commission presents statistics on the role of women in 
industrial organizations, and the empirical evidence confirms that the managerial make-up of firms has 
changed and improved over time. European countries (EU36) show, on average, increases in the 
percentages of female executives and CEOs in the largest listed companies from 2013 to 2018 (i.e., 
executives: from 12% to 19%; CEOs: from 3% to 7%). This trend is confirmed for all European countries, 
although the slopes are different. In detail, in Italy the average percentage of female executives increased 
by 89% (from 5% in 2013 to 10% in 2019); on the other hand, the percentage of female CEOs changed 
from 0% to 3%. Of course, these changes in corporate governance are not a spontaneous outcome: most 
national policy makers have enforced increases in female participation by introducing quota laws. This 
is also the case in Italy, with the so-called Golfo–Mosca law (120/2011). This law introduced a quota for 
the number of each gender on the executive body of a listed company: this number was to be no less than 
one fifth (to be increased to one third by the end of 2013) of the total number of members. The law came 
into force in 2012 and has recently been renewed to increase the share of the under-represented gender 
(law 157/2019, i.e. Tax Decree 2020). In Italy, as in most European countries, quota laws are not applied 
to the plethora of small or medium firms that represent the majority of economic actors, but only to listed 
or very large firms. However, the increasing attention being paid to equality of opportunities for reaching 
managerial positions within firms may have affected the economy as a whole, and may also have 
questioned the cultural model of a predominantly male leadership for smaller firms (Almond and Verba, 
2015; La Valle, 2006). Indeed, the general involvement of women in top positions, both in politics and 
in the economy, has increased over time and is still growing (EIGE, 2019). Moreover, the law had a spill-
over effect for financial institutions, by increasing the number of women on the board for unlisted banks 
too (Bongiovanni et al., 2019).  
Following this stream of research, the present paper investigates whether and to what extent the presence 
of women among the managers of Italian manufacturing firms affects corporate financial risk. We do 
this by using a large sample that is representative of Italian manufacturing firms. We decided to change 
the usual perspective of the empirical literature, which is too frequently performance oriented: the effect 
of female participation in management has been extensively investigated with a clear focus on economic 
performance, but this is only one of the aspects that might be influenced by a change in leadership. 
Moreover, the emerging empirical evidence is inexorably linked to the main cultural perception of 
women in the reference country, and those differences may partially explain the inconclusive empirical 
evidence. Indeed, when looking at the effect on performance of female participation in leading positions, 
some contributions find modest positive effects (Dezso and Ross, 2012; Green and Homroy, 2018), other 
studies show no effects (Comi et al., 2019 Ferrari et al., 2016; Gregory-Smith et al., 2013), while yet 
other studies argue that there is a negative impact (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; 
Matsa and Miller, 2013). Within these works, we observe a significant prevalence of contributions 
focused on large, very large or listed firms, while small and medium firms (SMEs) are often under-
represented, despite their importance in many economies, especially in southern European countries. 
Also with a specific focus on Italy, the empirical evidence fails to converge towards a clear conclusion 
on a prevailing positive or negative effect of female leadership on performance, even if the recent 
literature reports on an increasing number of studies (see, for instance, Devicienti et al., 2019; Ferrari et 
al., 2018; Flabbi et al., 2019; Maida and Weber, 2018; Manello et al., 2019). 
However, as anticipated, the recent literature on gender diversity underlines that, in general, firms with 
a woman as a director have other differences that go beyond a pure or direct effect on performance. 
Numerous existing studies converge on the idea that female leaders show generally higher risk aversion, 
a fact that might partially reshape corporate strategy and the corporate risk profile. This aspect, as 
highlighted by Sila et al. (2016), has already been thoroughly investigated in the financial and banking 
sector, where the focus on risk is more traditional and is motivated by the characteristics of the sector. 
Also, in more general contexts, authors have reached a consensus that there is a lower risk profile 
associated with female leadership (see, for instance, Adams and Ragunathan, 2017; Berger et al., 2014; 
Faccio et al., 2016; Huang and Kisgen, 2013; Sapienza et al., 2009) or in general to board diversity 
(Bernile et al., 2018). Only a few studies (e.g.., Faccio et al., 2016; Bernile et al., 2018) investigate the 
relationship that exists outside the banking sector between the presence of women in the boardroom and 
financial aspects, and our work aims to fill part of this gap by explicitly considering credit risk, following 
an early work by Wilson and Altanlar (2009). We aim to add new and more robust empirical evidence 
of a negative relationship between female participation in the boardroom or in the top management and 
credit risk, by focusing on a large and representative sample of Italian manufacturing firms. Our data on 
directors and senior managers are extracted from the AIDA database (provided by Bureau van Dijk), and 
we also use rating scores and credit score indicators. We provide evidence of a lower credit risk 
associated with the appointment of at least one woman among the top managers of the firm, using a 
model that takes into account individual fixed effects at firm level. As a robustness check, we also 
consider different subsamples (according to geographical regions and size classes) as well as a different 
kind of estimate (ordered probit, focusing on rating classes). Our main findings remain substantially 
unchanged for all our extensions and specifications, and we conclude in favour of a decrease in the credit 
risk when a woman becomes a top manager.   
The remainder of the paper is as follows: the next section presents the main theoretical findings on 
corporate governance and economic–financial performance; section 3 describes the methodologies and 
data used in the analysis; section 4 sets out and discusses the results; and the final paragraph contains our 
conclusions and final remarks on the topic. 
2. Theoretical background and literature 
The literature on gender diversity and firm management is quite rich and has grown strongly in the last 
decade. Great attention has been given to the volatility of firms’ performance and returns, while much 
less interest has been paid to the risk dimension. We therefore aim to contribute to filling this gap by 
investigating the relationship between female participation in the board of directors or top management 
and the firm’s credit risk, a measure of risk that is very rarely investigated.  
In general, we find a strong consensus for the idea that women are more risk-averse than men. This 
gender-specific risk behaviour may be due to a natural attitude (i.e. a different general level of 
testosterone), as argued by Sapienza et al. (2009), or to different opportunity sets (Schubert et al., 1999). 
The main emerging consequence is that women seem to be more cautious in their financial decisions and 
show lower risk tolerance than men (Fisher and Yao, 2017) . Watson and Robinson (2003) suggested 
that women are more risk-averse, while others have found that they are simply less self-confident than 
men, especially in financial and investment decisions (Barber and Odean, 2001; Byrnes et al., 1999; 
Croson and Gneezy, 2009), and are more concerned about the risk of losing control of their business 
(Constantinidis et al., 2006; Verheul and Thurik, 2001). Moro et al. (2017) investigated the effect of 
being a female entrepreneur in accessing credit. They found that firms run by women are less likely to 
apply for a loan, compared to firms run by men. The fear of being rejected, due to lack of self-confidence, 
generates a priori self-exclusion, and potentially leads to the firm missing out on lending opportunities 
that would be beneficial to its growth. Huang and Kisgen (2013) also proved that this caution exists with 
respect to debt funding. In their analysis of American listed companies, they showed that firms with 
female executives are less likely to issue debt to make acquisitions, and therefore that they grow more 
slowly. These results are consistent with the relative over-confidence of male executives compared with 
female executives.  
Consequently, female entrepreneurs are less prone to borrow, have a lower growth-orientation o invest 
less (Carter and Shaw, 2006; Pelger, 2011; Charness and Gneezy, 2012), and prefer to operate in low 
capital-intensive sectors, relying less on external finance.  
However, a prudent attitude among women towards making financial decisions can turn into more 
responsible and accurate behaviour. Beck et al. (2009), using a data set from a commercial lender in 
Albania, argued that female loan officers are better at screening and monitoring their borrowers, 
obtaining lower default rates than their male colleagues. Adams and Ferreira (2009), analysing a sample 
of US firms, observed that women, when appointed to boards of directors, do their job with a higher 
sense of duty and responsibility than male directors. In fact, they have better attendance records and are 
more likely to join monitoring committees. More recently, Bernile et al., (2018) analyse firms from 
different industries in US and find that higher board diversity, measured by demographic aspects 
including gender, is associated with lower risk, measured through stock return volatility 
In this vein, several studies have concentrated their attention on the role of women on boards of directors 
and their impact on the firm risk profile. Regardless of the type of firm (listed versus non-listed firms, or 
large corporations versus SMEs), sector (private versus public, financial versus non-financial) and 
geographical location, the evidence is quite clear-cut: when women sit at the decision-making table, they 
make companies less risky and more stable. 
Faccio et al. (2016), using a large sample of listed European companies, found that firms run by female 
CEOs have lower leverage, have more stable profitability and are more likely to survive than otherwise 
similar firms run by male CEOs. Additionally, the risk-taking of a given firm tends to decrease (increase) 
when a woman substitutes a man on the board of directors (or vice versa). Skala and Weill (2018) looked 
at the banking sector, and found that banks headed by female CEOs are less risky and have more capital. 
Interestingly, the bigger capital cushions are not required to absorb riskier assets, but are due to the higher 
risk aversion of the female CEOs. More recently, Suzuki and Avallaneda (2018) examined the 
relationship between gender and risk-taking behaviour in public finance. They targeted all city-level 
municipalities in Japan and found that the presence of women on local councils is positively correlated 
with risk-averse financial decisions. 
Another stream of studies has considered the relationship between female participation and firm 
performance. Indeed, if women are more risk-averse than men, we would also expect that firms perform 
differently when women are in positions of power. The main evidence from the recent empirical literature 
is still uncertain, and the real effect of female leadership remains an unsolved problem, as argued by 
Gagliarducci and Paserman (2015) and Pletzer et al. (2015). In fact, the literature describes potentially 
controversial results on female leadership, which remain strongly dependent on the specific context, the 
measure of performance and the econometrical technique employed. For example, Adams and Ferreira 
(2009), analysing a sample of US firms, concluded that the presence of women leaders negatively affects 
firms’ profitability when measured as Return on Assets (ROA) or Tobin’s q. Similar conclusions have 
been found by Ahern and Dittmar (2012) and Matsa and Miller (2013) for Norway, the first country in 
Europe to introduce gender quotas. Comi et al. (2019) analysed a European sample where the ROA index 
was used as measure of firm performance, but found no statistically significant effect except in Italy and 
Spain, where a positive effect was found when considering total factor productivity. Similarly, an absence 
of effects was found in Italy by Ferrari et al. (2016) and in the UK by Gregory-Smith et al. (2013), even 
though in both works firm performance was evaluated through market value or other accounting 
measures. A positive effect was found by Green and Homroy (2018), who studied the effect on the ROA 
index of a large European sample when women were on the board of directors and also when they were 
on board committees. If, of the one hand, researchers have suggested many measures of performances 
then, on the other, female participation in business management has also been represented in different 
ways. For example, Christiansen et al. (2016) considered a very large sample of non-listed and listed 
European companies. They found that the presence of women in senior positions positively affects firms’ 
profitability, with a strong impact in innovative sectors.  
Following the suggestions from the literature, we used the proportion of women in top/senior positions 
as the independent variable in our study to evaluate the effect of this on the credit risk of Italian 
manufacturing firms. To our knowledge, few works have addressed our specific research question using 
a credit score measurement as the dependent variable and measuring the effect of women in corporate 
leadership (considering seats on the board of directors and top management positions) on the credit 
classification. Wilson and Altanlar (2009) analysed the characteristics of the directors and owners of over 
900,000 private limited UK firms in 2007-2008 in order to discover whether there was a relationship 
between financial performance and the management traits. Out of this sample, 17,000 companies failed 
in 2008, and the researchers estimated their insolvency risk and predicted failures using, respectively, 
the z-score approach (Altman, 1968) and a logit/conditional mixed process technique (Probit-IV 
regression). The results, even if they are dated, suggest a possibly negative relationship between the ratio 
of female directors and insolvency, arguing the possibility, which is actually well documented, of strong 
risk-awareness among women in conducting business.   
3. Methodology and data 
3.1 Methodology and empirical strategy 
A simple way to evaluate the impact of female top managers on a firm’s credit risk is to estimate the 
difference for firms that have at least one female top manager between the risk indicator before and after 
the year in which a female manager was first appointed to the firm. Clearly, the most recent economic 
literature on female participation highlights the presence of potential endogeneity problems in relation to 
the arrival of a female manager at a firm and the unobservable characteristics of the firm. These 
characteristics depend strongly on the quality and ability of managers (or of owners in the case of small 
firms without managers), so that the identification of the causal effect crucially depends on the possibility 
of separating these unobservable factors, as well as other observable factors, from the presence of female 
top managers. Our partial solution to this issue is, on the one hand, the inclusion of all the available 
controls for observable factors, reflecting differences among firms in relation to financial/economic 
aspects (i.e. size, past profitability, and past physical capital intensity) and, on the other hand, the use of 
a fixed effects estimator. In fact, it is more difficult to deal with unobservable factors, such as specific 
features like firm tradition, culture, or firm “quality” (which substantially coincides with the ability or 
qualities of the main decision maker), which potentially creates endogeneity problems. These 
unobservable factors undoubtedly influence the probability of there being female managers among the 
leaders of the firm. If we are willing to assume that firm culture or the ability/quality/capacity of 
managers are stable over time, any potential endogeneity problem can be solved through the inclusion of 
firm fixed effects in the following regression model:  
𝐶𝑅௜௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒௜௧ିଵ + 𝛿𝑍௜௧ିଵ + 𝜂𝐷௧ + 𝜔௜ + 𝜀௜௧  (1) 
where 𝐶𝑅௜௧ represents the measure of credit risk and 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒௜௧ is our variable of interest, included in the 
form of either a dummy variable identifying the firm-year observation in which at least one top manager 
is a female or, alternatively, the proportion of top managers who are female. The female dummy (as well 
as the proportion of women) changes over time and becomes active when a female manager arrives at 
the firm. 𝑍௜௧ is a vector of firm-level time-variant controls, observed one year before the credit risk 
indicator to reduce simultaneity issues (i.e. firm size, capital intensity and profitability). 𝐷௧ is a vector of 
year fixed effects (i.e. dummies for the specific year of analysis) together with other aspects such as 
geographical macro area, region or industrial activity (on the basis of Ateco 2-digit codes, that follow 
NACE classification of economic activities), to catch macroeconomic trends. The last part of the 
equation, 𝜔௜ + 𝜀௜௧, indicates the error term: the first component 𝜔௜ is the firm-specific fixed effect and 
might be correlated with the presence of female managers, while the second component, 𝜀௜௧, is a purely 
white noise error term. The estimated coefficient of the variable Femalet represents the difference in the 
level of credit risk due to the presence of a female manager (in either the female dummy or the female 
share specification). 
Our empirical strategy consists of the estimation of equation (1) for the whole sample, using different 
model specifications in order to test the robustness of the results and then repeating the estimates for 
different subsamples. All the estimates take into account the panel structure of the database and include 
firm fixed effects as well as year-specific fixed effects.  
The second empirical approach is based on a different model, where the dependent variable assumes a 
discrete form, with the aim of focusing only on relevant changes in the credit score indicator. In fact, our 
data sources allow us to group firms according to different categories of default risk, or rating classes, 
exactly as in the case of the labels used by the large rating companies (Moody’s; Standard and Poor’s; 
Fitch Ratings). There are seven identified categories, and the next subsection provides all the relevant 
technical details. As regards the estimation strategy, the shift to a categorical variable as the dependent 
variable leads to a radical change in the estimation model, since it can no longer be based on a simple 
OLS. In this case we opt for an ordered probit model estimated though maximum likelihood: 
𝑅𝐶௜௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒௜௧ିଵ + 𝛿𝑍௜௧ିଵ + 𝜂𝐷௧ + 𝜀௜௧   (2) 
where 𝑅𝐶௜௧ represents the classification of the firm during a specific year into a rating class from 1 to 7. 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒௜௧ is our variable of interest, included only in the form of a dummy variable identifying the firm-
year observation in which at least one top manager is female. In this case the model does not include 
firm-specific fixed effects, but we compensate by using the richer specification in term of interactions 
among year, geographical location and industrial activity (i.e. our baseline specification, defined in table 
3). 
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
Our empirical analysis is essentially based on administrative, financial and economic information on 
Italian manufacturing firms drawn from the AIDA database provided by Bureau van Dijk. We combine 
and process information from three specific modules of this data source: the “rating and creditworthiness 
section” available from 2015 onwards, the “main representative” section, which gives information on the 
managers and owners of each firm, and, finally, the standard financial section.  
The creditworthiness section provides us with two different indicators: the credit score and the rating 
class. As is known, a credit score measures how likely it is that the borrower will pay back its loans on 
time, so it can be used to assess the likelihood of obtaining finance from external sources. In the AIDA 
database the credit score indicator, recorded as a continuous variable ranging from zero to 1,000, is 
provided not directly by Bureau van Dijk but by KF Economics, a leader in the definition of financial 
tools for credit scoring in Italy (http://kfeconomics.com/wordpress/la-societa/). The indicator is 
calculated according to a mixture of financial and economic information drawn from the balance sheet, 
with a strong weight assigned to the current sustainability of the financial sources. The precise 
methodology adopted, and the exhaustive list of the aspects considered, is not available, but we can 
assume that the indicator is obtained in the same way for all the firms involved.  
A rating score provides a synthetic evaluation of the financial situation of a firm. Before the entry into 
force of Basel II (in detail, the first pillar of this) in 2007, rating scores could only be assigned by the 
ECAI (External Credit Assessment Institution), but since the European Directive came into force, all 
banks and financial institutions can create an internal rating system in order to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of borrowers. Following the approaches suggested by the European Commission and 
the examples of big international rating agencies (i.e., Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings), 
all the interested subjects have created internal rating systems. These scores have become a useful and 
synthetic indicator for, on the one hand, credit institutions, and, on the other hand, firms, who can use 
this evaluation as a key variable for strategic financing decisions (Ruiz et al., 2019; . Indeed, the recent 
literature focuses on the relevance of credit scores or financial ratings as fundamental information in the 
microfinance field, because they play a crucial role in investment decisions for both financial regulators 
and loan customers (Shi et al., 2019). However, it is clear that the precise assignment of credit scores or 
ratings depend crucially on the criteria adopted by those who develop them, so they differ from one 
another. Scholars have developed and validated many models that use different variables but have the 
same aim of distinguishing between firms or individuals who are likely or unlikely to be able to fulfil 
their financial commitments.  
As mentioned above, the credit score indicator used in the present study varies between 0 (for failed 
firms) and 1,000 (for extremely healthy firms), and, based on these scores, the AIDA database provides 
a classification of the firms according to seven standard rating classes using the specific thresholds that 
are reported in table 1. Moving from the KR7 class (extremely healthy firms) to KR1 (failed firms), 
Bureau van Dijk also provides an average probability of default (PD), with an inverse relationship to the 
credit score indicators. 
Table 1: Rating classes, descriptions, average default probabilities and credit score thresholds 
Rating 
Class Description 
Average 
PD 
Credit 
score 
KR7 Good solvency but possible weakness due to short-term events 0.002 771-1000 
KR6 Sufficient solvency but in adverse economic conditions would have difficulty in repaying debts 0.006 646-770 
KR5 Sufficient solvency but possible default condition in adverse economic conditions  0.021 541-645 
KR4 High financial vulnerability but able in the short term to repay debts 0.061 476-540 
KR3 Low financial solvency 0.151 411-475 
KR2 Possible default situation 0.343 356-410 
KR1 High default risk 0.899 0-355 
 
Since the concept of rating is usually associated with classes or groups to which the market refers to 
assess the reliability of a firm, we use both the credit score and the rating class as dependent variables to 
test whether there is a difference in results according to the indicator used. 
The second fundamental piece of information is retrieved from the composition of the board of directors 
or, in the case of a unique decision maker, personal information on this subject. In particular, we use 
information on the gender of each director/unique decision maker in order to build an indicator of the 
gender composition of the governing body of each firm. In particular, the AIDA database reports some 
limited personal information on the unique executive, CEO, or president, or the members of the board of 
directors in the case of firms with a more complex corporate governance structure. As we underline 
above, in many cases of smaller firms or those with a very simple corporate governance structure, these 
positions collapse into a single person who in some case coincides with the single owner/single executive. 
The challenge of considering larger, medium and small firms all together, as well as firms with different 
degrees of complexity of corporate governance structure, requires the top management to be defined in 
a sufficiently flexible way so that it is suitable for different categories of firm. We decided to 
accommodate the presence of women among the top managerial figures in as flexible a way as possible, 
by assuming a definition of top managers that includes all the members of the board of directors, the 
CEO, the executives and the president/vice president of the board, as well as single executives or a single 
final owner in the absence of any other information. We use two substantially different indicators for the 
female presence among top managers: a dummy that indicates whether at least one person among the 
decision makers is a woman, and the proportion of women among those decision makers.  
Table 2 reports the average proportion of women at the level of the area or region, the distribution for 
female participation across the group of firms characterized by a simple corporate governance model (i.e. 
those having a single CEO or administrative or senior manager) and those with multiple senior managers, 
and the respective proportions of women. In small firms, that is, those led by a single executive, around 
80 per cent of the firms in the sample are managed only by men, with no woman being counted among 
their governing bodies or top positions. This percentage, as expected, drops to 54 per cent when we 
observe larger manufacturing companies that have more complex corporate governance structures. 
However, despite the fact that 46 per cent of larger firms have one or more female leaders, the average 
proportion of women among the board members or top managers in our sample is 20%, in line with the 
general evidence from Italy.  
Table 2 shows the distribution of the sample between single executive firms and firms with multiple 
board members, and according to the geographical area of the firm. The average percentage of women 
among the directors is around 20%, in line with the results in other studies in Italy,1 and the situation is 
very similar for smaller firms (around 40,000 of them) with a simple model of corporate governance and 
a sole director (i.e. an amministratore unico in Italian) and larger firms (around 68,000) with more 
complex models of corporate governance based on a board of directors.  
                                                          
1 For non-listed firms, the proportion of women among the directors is around 17% in Italy (https://know.cerved.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/CERVED_LE-DONNE-AL-VERTICE.pdf), while the OECD reports a percentage of around 
27% https://www.oecd.org/italy/Gender2017-ITA-en.pdf 
Table 2: Shares of women among directors across regions, macro areas and sizes of firm, using the last 
year (2017) as reference 
Region/Macro area 
Total sample   Single director   Board of directors 
Share 
N of 
firm   Share 
N of 
firm   Share 
N of 
firm 
Valle d’Aosta 0.136 117  0.147 34  0.132 83 
Piemonte 0.203 7728  0.183 2201  0.211 5527 
Liguria 0.203 1408  0.190 483  0.210 925 
Lombardia 0.204 28117  0.199 8267  0.206 19850 
North-West 0.203 37370   0.195 10985   0.207 26385 
Trentino-Alto Adige 0.132 1535  0.102 420  0.144 1115 
Veneto 0.190 14888  0.168 4101  0.199 10787 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.171 2507  0.142 678  0.182 1829 
Emilia-Romagna 0.197 11944  0.184 3158  0.202 8786 
North-East 0.189 30874   0.169 8357   0.196 22517 
Toscana 0.222 9062  0.234 3048  0.216 6014 
Umbria 0.249 1584  0.278 528  0.234 1056 
Lazio 0.245 5543  0.253 3464  0.231 2079 
Marche 0.212 4648  0.215 1704  0.211 2944 
Centre 0.228 20837   0.240 8744   0.219 12093 
Abruzzo 0.223 2153  0.229 1205  0.215 948 
Basilicata 0.183 540  0.183 317  0.183 223 
Calabria 0.219 1083  0.203 715  0.251 368 
Campania 0.213 6454  0.219 4370  0.201 2084 
Molise 0.226 313  0.245 184  0.199 129 
Puglia 0.211 4302  0.216 2722  0.204 1580 
Sardegna 0.205 1117  0.218 564  0.191 553 
Sicilia 0.223 3158  0.221 1852  0.227 1306 
South & Islands 0.215 19120   0.218 11929   0.209 7191 
Total Italy 0.206 108201   0.206 40015   0.206 68186 
 
If we investigate in more detail the geographical picture of female leaders, we observe that females are 
surprisingly more common in the south, especially in smaller firms with a unique decision maker, while 
they are under-represented in the north east in both categories of firms. Regions in the north west are in 
line with the Italian situation, while some marginal regions like Valle d’Aosta and Trentino-Alto Adige 
show regional averages far below the national average, with a lower proportion of female directors. The 
central regions show the best situation in terms of female representation, with an average percentage of 
women decision makers of around 23% and a positive performance in both Umbria and Lazio in both 
groups.  
A graphical representation of the picture, as shown in figure 1, shows the main trends during the period 
under investigation: it compares the number of firms with at least one female director at municipality 
level in Italy for the two years 2015 and 2017. Darker zones represent municipalities with a higher 
percentage of firms in which there is at least one woman on the board. Looking at these maps, the results 
suggest that, over the period under consideration, the number of municipalities with women involved in 
making decisions for firms has grown, with a larger increase in the north and centre of Italy. A lower 
increase or a similar distribution can be observed for both the south of Italy and the islands.  
 
Figure 1: Firms with at least one woman director at municipality level (2015 vs 2017) 
 
On the credit score side, figure 2 illustrates the kernel density graph of the credit scores according to 
different subsampling strategies: the geographical location of the firm, the size class and the year. First, 
panel (a) of figure 2 shows that the credit scores are not uniformly distributed across the macro regions 
of Italy, and that the shapes of the credit score distribution are not exactly the same for the south/centre 
region and the north. We observe a larger right-tail distribution of the credit score indicator for the 
subsample of firms located in the north west and the north east, suggesting that the average credit scores 
may be structurally lower for firms located in the south and centre of Italy. In particular, a higher 
proportion of firms in the north show higher credit scores (i.e. we observe a partial second mode at around 
a value of 800), which translates into a larger proportion of firms belonging to the higher rating class 
KR7, mainly at the threshold of that class (771-1000). Second, panel (b) of figure 2 shows another 
unexpected piece of evidence from our data focused on manufacturing firms: large firms show the worst 
performance in terms of credit score indicators, with a surprisingly more positive performance by micro 
firms. The better profile in terms of credit score is for the two intermediate classes, medium and small 
firms, which show a larger average and a fatter right tail of the distribution. Third, looking at annual 
trends and the annual shape of the credit score distributions, we can observe very similar profiles in term 
of distribution, with a weak tendency for a slight improvement, but the effects on the global distribution 
are negligible, as suggested by the graphic reported in panel (c) of figure 2. For each of the three years 
considered, we observe a main mode of around 500 and a second partial mode at around the level of 800, 
with a distribution characterized by a fatter right tail in all the years.  
Figure 2. Distribution of credit score indicators across macro regions, by size class of the firm (2007), 
and during the analysed period. 
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4. Results 
In this section we present our results and discuss the main implications of our analysis, with a focus on 
female participation in the government of a firm and the firm’s credit risk. As anticipated, we concentrate 
our attention on two different measures of female participation, tailored to the specific features of our 
data: the female_dummy, which is equal to one if there is at least a woman on the board or among the top 
managers, and the female_share, which is the percentage of women on the board or among the top 
managers. We use as a baseline the specification with the female_dummy, while all the analyses are 
replicated using the proportion of women among the top managers as a robustness check; this second set 
of results gives very similar findings. All the dependent variables, and then also our variables of interest, 
are lagged in order to reduce contemporaneity and endogeneity issues. Table 3 reports our main results 
and represents the baseline for all the additional analyses proposed in robustness checks or as extensions 
of the main findings.  
4.1 Baseline model, whole Italian manufacturing sector 
Starting with standard OLS estimates for all the figures over the years, the first column of table 3 reports 
a very strong and statistically significant impact of the female dummy on the credit score indicator, even 
if many unobservable factors may affect the credibility of the coefficient and suggest an over-estimation 
of the real effects. In fact, columns 2-5 of table 3 collect estimates from four regression models that 
include firm-level fixed effects, and show more reliable results both for the gender issue and other control 
factors. The female dummy, indicating the presence of at least one female director, shows a positive and 
stable coefficient across the four model specifications. The magnitude of the effect is small but not 
negligible, and shows an increase in the credit score indicator (which ranges from 0 to 1,000) of around 
2.2 points, considering that at the mean value of the indicator in the whole sample (which is around 500) 
the magnitude is around half a percentage point. The coefficient from the OLS model overestimates the 
real effect, highlighting the role of endogenous factors that give a positive bias in the effect; however, 
the effect is persistent, and it is always significant and positive. 
Other regressors include standard firm-level controls such as an indicator of profitability (the return on 
assets), firm size (computed as the natural log of revenues), mechanization (using the capital to labour 
ratio, computed as fixed assets over labour costs), and financial equilibrium (using the leverage index, 
computed as capital over external debt). Moreover, in the different specifications we include as 
alternatives different sets of dummies and interactions for capturing different sectoral, geographical and 
temporal specificities. The other firm-level controls have substantially their expected role in influencing 
credit scores, with a very strong and positive connection with past profitability (lagged ROA) and past 
financial independence (lagged Leverage), and a positive relationship with firm size. These main findings 
are stable and confirmed across all the models reported in table 3 and therefore they appear robust to the 
different sets of industry and geographical interactions with year dummies. 
 
Table 3: Female dummy (i.e. at least one woman among top managers/directors) 
 (1)   (2) (3) (4) 
(baseline) 
(5)  
VARIABLES OLS   Fixed effect 
Female_dummy (lagged) 11.40***  2.266** 2.264** 2.293** 2.264** 
 (0)  (0.0373) (0.0375) (0.0352) (0.0376) 
Return_on_Assets (lagged) 350.9***  206.7*** 206.5*** 206.5*** 206.4*** 
 (0)  (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Firm_size (lagged) 4.999***  23.87*** 23.84*** 23.83*** 23.85*** 
 (0)  (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Capital_to_Labour_ratio (lagged) 9.84e-05***  8.85e-06 1.31e-05 1.06e-05 9.31e-06 
 (0.00107)  (0.935) (0.904) (0.922) (0.932) 
Leverage (lagged) 2.677***  0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 
 (0.00104)  (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Firm-level fixed effects 
Year fixed effects 
No 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Macro areas interacted with years ---  --- Yes --- --- 
Regions interacted with years Yes  --- --- Yes Yes 
2-digit Ateco codes interacted with years Yes  --- --- --- Yes 
Constant 471.1***  295.7*** 296.0*** 297.7*** 299.0*** 
  (0)   (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Observations 177,354  177,354 177,354 177,354 177,354 
R-squared 0.219  0.248 0.248 0.249 0.249 
Number of firms    100,317 100,317 100,317 100,317 
Robust p value in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
If the presence of at least one woman among the top managers gives a first insight into a female presence, 
the intensity of this presence represents another important aspect that should be considered. We measure 
this intensity through the proportion of women among the top managers.2 The results of the regressions 
in which the variable female_share is included instead of the female dummy are collected in table 4, with 
the same model specification as reported in table 3. In this case, too, our estimates confirm a positive and 
significant impact of increasing the presence of women among the top managers, with the coefficient 
remaining more stable throughout the passage from the simple OLS to the model with firm-level fixed 
effects. The magnitude of the coefficient is comparable with the one estimated for the dummy, and with 
an increase of 100% in terms of female share, the baseline model (column 5) shows an increase of 3.6% 
in terms of the credit score indicator.  
The other controls substantially confirm their expected impact on credit scores, with positive large and 
significant impacts of past profitability, past size and past financial independence. In the case when the 
proportion of women is used as an indicator of female participation in decision making, too, our main 
findings are robust to all specifications and confirm that female participation reduces the credit score 
indicator. On the other side of the coin, given the structure of the credit score indicator and its negative 
relationship with default probability as shown in table 1, our results say that an increase in female 
participation substantially contributes to a reduction in default probability. Therefore, a female presence 
seems consistent with a change in financial corporate strategy to demonstrate more prudence and a more 
balanced apportionment of capital between debt and the firm’s own capital. 
Table 4: Share of women among the top managers for the whole sample 
  (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS  Fixed Effects 
Female_share (lagged) 3.408***  3.703** 3.661** 3.665** 3.670** 
 (0.000108)  (0.0334) (0.0354) (0.0353) (0.0350) 
Return_on_Assets (lagged) 350.7***  206.7*** 206.5*** 206.5*** 206.4*** 
 (0)  (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Firm_size (lagged) 5.179***  23.88*** 23.85*** 23.83*** 23.85*** 
 (0)  (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Capital_to_Labour_ratio (lagged) 9.62e-05***  8.81e-06 1.30e-05 1.06e-05 9.28e-06 
 (0.00150)  (0.935) (0.904) (0.922) (0.932) 
Leverage (lagged) 2.686***  0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 
 (0.00103)  (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Constant 488.5***  381.3*** 381.5*** 381.9*** 382.8*** 
 (0)  (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Firm-level fixed effects No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro areas interacted with years ---  --- Yes --- --- 
Regions interacted with years Yes  --- --- Yes Yes 
2-digit Ateco codes interacted with years Yes  --- --- --- Yes 
Observations 177,354  177,354 177,354 177,354 177,354 
                                                          
2 A caveat on the nature of the data has to be highlighted. Our firms mainly consist of micro firms with monistic 
corporate governance bodies (i.e. a unique executive who often coincides with the owner). The ratio will then be either 
zero or one depending on the gender of the owner.   
R-squared 0.217  0.248 0.248 0.249 0.249 
Number of firms     100,317 100,317 100,317 100,317 
Robust p value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.2 Extensions and other evidence  
The Italian context is characterized by a generally low rate of participation of women in leading positions, 
as highlighted by Devicienti et al. (2019) or Bruno et al. (2018), with substantial differences between 
geographical areas. Together with traditional and cultural differences, the preliminary evidence on macro 
areas motivates an extension of our analysis to regional differences and features, to give a deeper 
understanding of our main findings. 
From the point of view of the empirical strategy adopted, we rely on subsampling according to the 
geographical locations of firms, so as to be able to estimate the relationship using firm fixed effects. In 
particular, we use as a reference our baseline specification in column 5 of table 3 and we split the sample 
into the four main macro areas, the north west, the north east, the centre and the south. This is done in 
order to capture the geographical differences that are very pronounced in Italy. The results are displayed 
in table 5. We expect that the northern regions, where there are more women in the labour market, would 
also benefit more from having women among the firm managers, but our results only partially support 
this evidence. In fact, table 5 shows that in two of the subsamples the female dummy plays a positive and 
significant role: the north west (+3 points in the credit score indicator) and the central region (+4.5 
points). These areas drive the globally positive effect, while in the north east the effect is still positive 
but not significant. Southern Italy registers a dynamic that is further from the general trend, with a 
negative coefficient for the female dummy, even if this is not significant. We interpret these results by 
looking at the general evidence on the proportion of women among top managers in table 2. In the north 
eastern regions, female participation is lower than the national level, and the small coefficient confirms 
the weaker influence of female managers on corporate strategies, which is probably affected by the 
difficulties in reaching a critical mass of women as well as by the predominantly male-oriented 
leadership. In the north western and central regions, the presence of women is stronger and this greater 
integration of women among managers can influence the strategies and, as a consequence, the financial 
structure of a firm, with a positive effect on the credit score indicator. The less intuitive evidence comes 
from the southern regions, where the share of women among managers is high, as is confirmed by other 
sources (ManagerItalia, 2019). However, to interpret our unexpected results we have to understand the 
framework and the picture of public incentives in the south during recent years. Since 2014, the Italian 
Ministry for Equal Opportunities has made it possible for ‘female firms’ to access specific financial 
sources under favourable conditions and with a public guarantee. ‘Female firms’ are generally defined 
as new firms founded by women, but they also include previously existing firms where most of the 
executives or owners are women; this second case may be of potential interest in our analysis. In fact, 
this kind of instrument to incentivize women to participate as entrepreneurs or managers, together with 
other incentives on regional bases, have been particularly used in the south to sustain economic activities, 
with a potentially positive effect on the amount of debt because of the favourable conditions. This 
mechanism might partially inflate the size of debt in female firms, and could be one of the possible 
explanations for the negative sign we find in our econometric model.  
 
Table 5: Geographical differences according to Italian macro areas, subsamples, and baseline 
specification 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
VARIABLES North west   North east   Centre   South 
Female dummy (lagged) 3.134*  1.039  4.654*  -2.061 
 (0.0644)  (0.581)  (0.0841)  (0.505) 
Return_on_Assets (lagged) 222.0***  284.9***  150.9***  172.8*** 
 (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
Firm_size (lagged) 25.45***  20.16***  28.67***  22.16*** 
 (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
Capital_to_Labour_ratio (lagged) 0.00106***  0.000109  -8.74e-05  -0.000160 
 (0.00152)  (0.763)  (0.528)  (0.561) 
Leverage (lagged) 0.0577**  5.362***  2.708***  0.560*** 
 (0.0333)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
Firm-level fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regions interacted with years Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2-digit Ateco codes interacted with years Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant 377.5***  404.4***  342.4***  382.6*** 
 (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
Observations 63,087  51,656  33,861  28,750 
R-squared 0.252  0.338  0.231  0.221 
Number of firms 34,666  28,394  19,470  17,787 
Robust p value in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The last angle of our analysis is based on the expected differences for the different sizes of firm; in this 
case, too, our estimation strategy is still based on subsampling to show the individual fixed effect. Table 
6 collects the results from the estimation of our baseline econometric model (i.e. column 5 of table 3) 
after separating the firms according to the European classification into dimensional classes, using only 
revenues as the reference. We divide our sample into micro firms (having less than 2 million Euros in 
terms of revenue), small firms (from 2 to 10 million), medium firms (from 10 to 50 million) and large 
firms (more than 250 million Euros), and we run separate regressions as we did for geographical area.  
Table 6: Size class according to European classification, subsamples, baseline specification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Micro Small Medium Large 
Female dummy (lagged) 3.378* 1.587 1.884 -24.65*** 
 (0.0551) (0.220) (0.657) (0.00420) 
Return_on_Assets (lagged) 180.5*** 366.8*** 253.5*** 283.2*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (2.52e-10) 
Firm_size (lagged) 26.01*** 11.67*** 2.629 15.89** 
 (0) (0) (0.569) (0.0285) 
Capital_to_Labour_ratio (lagged) 2.79e-05 -0.0204 -2.185 -2.228 
 (0.814) (0.326) (0.100) (0.352) 
Leverage (lagged) 0.168*** 3.212*** 12.95*** 42.27*** 
 (1.59e-09) (0) (0) (0) 
Firm-level fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regions interacted with years Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2-digit Ateco codes interacted with years Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 383.7*** 460.7*** 525.5*** 570.4** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0.0199) 
Observations 104,731 66,774 3,923 1,926 
R-squared 0.246 0.330 0.274 0.587 
Number of firms 61,621 35,016 2,032 1,648 
Robust p values in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results, in this case too, confirm our main results in the most numerous group, the micro firms, which 
represent more than 60% of the sample. As is partially expected, in very small firms when a woman joins 
the board of directors or becomes an executive (i.e. the information given by the female dummy), her 
influence on the firm’s strategy is not negligible. As a consequence, according to our prior discussion on 
risk aversion, she might be able to adjust the corporate strategy and influence the financial or debt 
structure, with a predicted influence of 3.3 points on the credit score indicator. For other firms 
characterized by a small size (i.e. small and medium firms), the results are more uncertain and only 
marginally or barely significant, but they still remain positive. By contrast, the effect of a new female 
among the top managers in a large firm seems to be negative and significant and the magnitude of the 
coefficient is very large. However, we must be cautious because of the small number of large firms, 
which represent only 16% our sample. 
 
4.3 The influence of female participation on rating classes 
The credit score dependent variable is a continuous indicator in all the previous regressions, but most 
financial evaluations are based on the concept of rating, which is usually structured as a class variable. 
Therefore, it is not all changes in credit score values that are relevant for a firm, but only those that 
influence its classification into a specific rating class, which is the real information that is relevant for 
the market. Is the presence of women on the board able to improve the credit rating of a firm, by 
upgrading it to a higher class? To test this question, we carry out an ordered probit analysis to take into 
account the ascending order of the credit score, on the basis of equation (2), using the baseline 
specification in table 3 as reference, excluding firm-level fixed effects.3 We present the results in table 7 
in terms of the marginal effect regarding our variable of interest, where the coefficients for the same 
controls of the baseline specification are omitted but are in line with the previous findings. As is well 
known, coefficients from Maximum Likelihood estimates of an ordered probit model are not equivalent 
to the marginal effects. We compute the marginal effects according to the standard transformation –
dP(n)/dF, with P as the probability of being in the nth class rate and F the female dummy, relative to the 
dummy variable of having only women on the board.  
Our findings are coherent with the previous results, showing a positive effect of the presence of at least 
one woman, but, of course, in this case the marginal effect should be split for each rating class. Table 7 
provides four negative coefficients for the female dummy when estimated for the four worst classes in 
term of rating, with the clear message that the presence of a woman among the managers reduces the 
probability of having a low rating judgment. On the other side of the coin, we find a positive and 
significant coefficient for the female dummy for the best rating classes, with a stronger effect in terms of 
magnitude for the two best rating groups. In fact, the presence of at least one woman among the top 
managers increases, by 1.6 and 1.4 per cent, respectively, the probability of being in the KR7 or KR6 
class. This last model confirms the relevance of a female presence in increasing the financial 
sustainability of a firm, but also confirms that this effect is not negligible and does indeed contribute to 
improving the final rating judgment: that is, a female presence is a determinant in improving 
discontinuous creditworthiness indicators.  
Table 7: Marginal effects estimated for the female dummy (i.e. the presence of at least one woman among 
the top managers) on the probability of being in a certain credit class (one to seven); ordered probit 
model. 
Rating Class Marginal 
Effect 
Std. Err. Z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
1 -.0039021 .0002344 -16.65 0.000 -.0043616 -.0034427 
2 -.0090878 .0005324 -17.07 0.000 -.0101312 -.0080443 
3 -.0158472 .0009207 -17.21 0.000 -.0176517 -.0140426 
4 -.006395 .0003739 -17.10 0.000 -.0071279 -.0056621 
5 .005045 .0002978 16.94 0.000 .0044614 .0056287 
6 .0140216 .0008146 17.21 0.000 .0124249 .0156183 
                                                          
3 In the context of ordered probit models, the inclusion of individual fixed effects is still questioned in terms of the 
relative advantage in comparison to the estimation difficulties.  
7 .0161654 .0009414 17.17 0.000 .0143203 .0180105 
 
5. Conclusions and final remarks 
Our analysis offers important insights into the influence of women on the financial structure of a firm, 
measured according to credit scores and rating classes. Our paper offers new results on female 
representation among top managerial positions, suggesting that women still remain under-represented 
despite their presence having increased over time, with some differences in terms of geographical area 
and the average size of the firm. Focusing on the Italian manufacturing industry, the proportion of women 
on the management board is around 20%. Our empirical analysis, mainly based on standard regression 
models, employs lagged explanatory variables in combination with firm-level fixed effects to reduce 
contemporaneity and endogeneity issues, which are both potential sources of bias. All our estimates 
confirm that the presence of women among the top managers reduces the firm-level financial risk, 
measured as a continuous credit score indicator or as the rating class in which the firm is categorized. In 
particular, the presence of at least one woman among the top managers contributes to an improvement in 
the firm credit score of around half a percentage point at the mean, and the results are confirmed if the 
female share is used instead of the simple dummy. Geographical specificities play a crucial role, with 
most of the global results being driven by firms located in the north west and the centre of Italy, in 
contrast with a neutral situation in the north east and the south. Another fundamental aspect is the size of 
the business, with the positive effect being mainly driven by smaller firms, where one woman can really 
make a difference in influencing corporate strategy. Moreover, our main finding on the reduction in credit 
risk associated with female participation is confirmed when the attention is focused on the rating class. 
Our evidence is confirmed by an ordered probit model estimating the probability of being in a certain 
rating class in the light of female participation. In this case, too, our results show that the presence of at 
least one woman on the board increases the probability of having a better rating judgment, confirming 
that the positive effect of women is determinant and effective. 
In conclusion, our study confirms that promoting women’s participation in managing and leading firms 
is important and has to be further sustained. Some initiatives have already been taken, and their effects 
are coming to light. For example, the quota rule for boards of directors of listed companies has increased 
the number of seats held by women, and, looking at small and medium enterprises, subsidized loans for 
female entrepreneurship have encouraged the growth of new business opportunities. Despite these 
positive effects, the data recording the inclusion of women in top management positions reveal that the 
female share is still low, especially in those countries like Italy where both the general and the workplace 
culture is male-oriented. Policy makers should educate the market to ensure a more gender-balanced 
representation, assisting – and in certain cases forcing – individuals and firms to experience the positive 
contribution of women to the financial soundness of the firm.  
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